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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in computing have allowed for the possibility to
collect large amounts of data on personal activities and private liv-
ing spaces. Collecting and publishing a dataset in this environment
can cause concerns over privacy of the individuals in the dataset.
In this paper we examine these privacy concerns. In particular,
given a target application, how can we mask sensitive attributes
in the data while preserving the utility of the data in that target
application. Our focus is on protecting attributes that are hidden
and can be inferred from the data by machine learning algorithms.
We propose a generic framework that (1) removes the knowledge
useful for inferring sensitive information, but (2) preserves the
knowledge relevant to a given target application. We use deep neu-
ral networks and generative adversarial networks (GAN) to create
privacy-preserving perturbations. Our noise-generating network
is compact and efficient for running on mobile devices. Through
extensive experiments, we show that our method outperforms con-
ventional methods in effectively hiding the sensitive attributes
while guaranteeing high performance for the target application.
Our results hold for new neural network architectures, not seen
before during training and are suitable for training new classifiers.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have witnessed an explosive growth in the
use of data-driven techniques in every aspect of our lives. Massive
amounts of data are collected and processed, to predict consumers’
behavior, to improve an airport’s safety measures, or to make en-
ergy delivery to buildings more efficient. While we celebrate the
convenience brought to us by these technologies, the collected
data can often be personal information and contain attributes that
could be extremely sensitive. With the recent breakthroughs in
machine learning, datasets that look innocent can be used to reveal
sensitive information. For example, one can infer the number of
people talking, their identity and social relationships and the type
of environment based solely on background noise [27–30, 41]. Data
from electricity meters can reveal sensitive information such as
the average household incomes and the occupants’ age distribu-
tions [42]. GPS trajectories can reveal social ties [12, 39] and are
very unique for each person [9]. Using WiFi scans, one can discover
occupancy patterns of private households [19]. The collection and
usage of such data raises important questions of ethics and privacy.
It is thus crucial that we try to find the correct balance between
using data to improve the quality of our lives while making sure
sensitive information is effectively protected.
The most used notion of privacy has been Differential Privacy
(DP) [10]. Consider a database in which each entry is a piece of
sensitive data (e.g., a patient’s medical history) which cannot be
released, but aggregated queries on these entries are considered
non-sensitive and allowed. More specifically, consider a database
D1 and a clone of it, D2, that lacks only one record u. If the answer
to a query to the two databases are almost indistinguishable (with
probability eε ), there is a good chance we cannot infer whether u
was in the database or not. This is termed ε-differential privacy.
Despite DP’s flexibility in providing a privacy guarantee in different
applications, it can sometimes be too restrictive [2] and in some
applications can hurt the utility of the data as a result [14].
There are other metrics for privacy, which are suited for well-
structured (e.g. relational) data, such as k-anonymity [37] among
a multitude of others. These criteria attempt to offer guarantees
about the ability of an attacker to easily recognize a certain record
within a database. All of these techniques, however, rely heavily
on a priori knowledge of which features in the data are either
sensitive themselves or can be linked to sensitive attributes. In well-
structured data, such as a patient’s medical record, we often have
a clear idea of which attributes are sensitive, such as the patient’s
name, address or other personally identifying information. This is a
key distinction from our work as we focus mainly on unstructured
data, such as images or binary vectors, where sensitive attributes
are not known beforehand and has to be automatically discovered
and erased.
In this paper, we argue that in certain application scenarios, we
are able to perform a more targeted privacy protection which takes
into account the content of data. We notice that it is not enough
to remove or perturb only the sensitive attributes to guarantee
privacy, as sensitive information may be embedded in multiple
attributes and may be learned through a classifier. We introduce a
procedure called PR-GAN : the user may specify a function f (such
as a classifier) that predicts target attributes and a function д that
predicts sensitive attributes. We then perturb the input data in a
way that f continues performing well while the performance of
д is severely impaired. The function f describes data utility and
function д characterizes the privacy concern.
Consider a case where volunteers want to contribute their photos
to train a classifier for a given task such as gender identification,
but they do not want their identities to be revealed in case the data
ends up in the wrong hands. Since the organization that keeps the
data may not be trusted to properly address the privacy concerns,
a better approach is ensuring privacy from the source. Figure 1
shows such a case where Alice and Bob want to share their photos
with an external server and they use perturbations to conceal their
identity. An adversary, using an auxiliary dataset has trained an
identity-revealing model. He then intercepts Bob’s message midway
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Figure 1: Using our method (PR-GAN), Alice sends anonymized data (denoted by blurred faces) to a server outside, making
sure her identity is not revealed but her gender is visible. When an adversary intercepts her message, he cannot de-anonymize
her identity using a classifier. However, the adversary can reveal Bob’s identity as he uses a naive noise generation method1.
and reveals his identity using this model. Our goal is that if Alice’s
photo, perturbed by our method, is intercepted, the adversary won’t
succeed in revealing her identity. Keep in mind that in order for
their photos to be useful, Alice and Bob both have to make sure that
their photos have valuable utility to train a gender identification
model.
To produce the tailored perturbation, we use Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GAN) [15]. A standard GAN is composed of two
neural networks contesting with each other in a zero-sum game
framework. More specifically, GAN simultaneously trains two mod-
els: a generative model G and a discriminative model D. G and D
take turns in training, where G tries to maximize the probability of
D making a mistake whileD tries to predict whether an input data
is fake (produced by G) as accurately as possible. After training, the
generator G produces artificial data that looks indistinguishable
from the original data by the discriminator D. GAN has achieved
visually appealing results in image generation [3] with the quality
of the synthesis improved by the year [18, 45]. Although the train-
ing of the noise generator network (G) might be expensive, the
network itself can be very compact and, as shown in Section 5.3,
suitable for running on personal devices. One can first train it with
as much computational resources as required, then deploy it to
remote devices. Once there, it can be used to anonymize data from
source. This procedure is depicted in Figure 2.
To test our method, we conduct extensive experiments with three
datasets: (1) MNIST, a standard benchmark image dataset, (2) a WiFi
signal dataset for indoor localization, and (3) PubFig, a dataset of
faces. For each dataset we show compelling evidence of the per-
formance of our perturbations, compared to baseline approaches.
Our method is capable of finding a good trade-off in difficult situa-
tions where the sensitive and target attributes are highly correlated.
Through experiments we demonstrate that although we plug in
specific classifiers in our training, the perturbation works for new
1Graphics are partially obtained from Twitter open-source emoji repository:
https://twemoji.twitter.com/
classifiers not seen before. The perturbed data can be used for infer-
ence purposes as well as training new models for target application
with a high performance.
The key properties of our approach can be summarized below.
(1) We provide a new framework for application-driven private
data-publishing which allows for elaborate user-specified
constraints. The trade-off between privacy and utility is built-
in in our proposed framework. This means that when sen-
sitive and target attributes are correlated, our solution can
easily allow users to find the right trade-off between privacy
(in terms of removing sensitive information) and utility (in
terms of preserving information on target attributes). Our
proposed framework is fairly generic and as shown in our
experiments applicable to different types of input data and
user specifications.
(2) We provide theoretical understandings of proposed PR-GAN
under idealistic settings combined with experimental results
under a variety of different data sets.
(3) To generate noise, our model does not need the whole dataset
to be present. Once trained, the generator can be deployed on
individual devices and generate perturbations locally from
source. Unlike prior works on data perturbation in a central-
ized setting, our method is computationally efficient and is
capable of making perturbations on large datasets.
(4) Our model does not transform the feature space to perturb
the data. This means that our perturbed data can be used
alongside the original data in target classification tasks with
high utility.
We first survey prior work and then present our solution.
2 RELATEDWORK
Privacy in Learning Algorithms A lot of work have focused
on manipulating the existing training and inference algorithms to
protect privacy of training data, for example, a differentially private
training algorithm for deep neural networks in which noise is added
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Figure 2: Left: the noise generator network is trained on a server, with enough computational resources, then it’s deployed to
users’ devices. Right: users can share data anonymized via PR-GAN with external entities.
to the gradient during each iteration [1, 33, 35], and a “teacher-
student" model using aggregated information instead of the original
signals [31]. It is also proposed to train a classifier in the cloud, with
multiple users uploading their perturbed data to a central node
without ever revealing their original private data [20, 25].
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing A different approach to
preserve privacy is making sure sensitive elements of the data is
removed before publishing it, often called privacy-preserving data
publishing (PPDP) [6]. A main line of work in this field focuses on
transforming numerical data into a secondary feature space, such
that certain statistical properties are preserved and data mining
tasks can be done with minimal performance loss [8, 24, 26]. These
methods guarantee data utility only on this secondary space. This
means that a classifier trained on the perturbed data is not guar-
anteed to perform well on original data. This can be troublesome
in a scenario where a classification model is trained on public, per-
turbed data and is going to be deployed on users’ personal devices
to perform a task locally on non-perturbed private user data. Our
perturbed data can be used in conjunction with original data in
specified target applications. In addition, some of the methods in
this category rely on expensive computations which renders them
infeasible on large datasets.
Adversarial Learning In recent years GANs have been success-
fully used to produce adversarial examples that can fool a classi-
fier to predict wrong classes [40]. Some have formulated the prob-
lem of privacy protection as producing adversarial examples for
an identity-revealing classifier [5, 17]. However, we demonstrate
through experiments that the absence of our proposed function,
f , that maintains the utility of the data, leads to a weaker utility
guarantee for the published data.
Similar efforts have been made in the fairness literature to make
sure that certain attributes (e.g., gender, or race) in a dataset do not
create unwanted bias that affects decision making systems [4, 13].
There is a key distinction between our work and that of Edwards
and Storkey [13] in how we train our model. To train their model
on a face dataset, the authors give two sets of data to the network,
where in the second set, the last name of the subjects is artificially
placed on each image. By providing two sets of acceptable and
unacceptable samples, they are letting the model know what a safe-
to-publish image looks like prior to training. In our method, the
model relies only on the two classifiers, f and д, to learn how the
published results should look like. It is also unclear whether f and д
in their work will reach an optimal state given that they are trained
from scratch together with the generative model.
Keep in mind that our approach builds on top of the existing
literature on privacy-preserving learning algorithms. After using
our method to remove sensitive information from a dataset, one can
apply any of the existing privacy-preserving learning algorithms
to further protect the privacy of users. Finally, although our model
uses a classifier f to guarantee high utility for certain desired tasks,
a GAN by nature produces artificial samples indistinguishable from
real ones, which makes the published data potentially useful for
applications not specified by f .
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Suppose that we have a dataset where the i-th entry is a vector
xi ∈ RN coming from an unknown distribution Pdata, with a corre-
sponding sensitive label yiP ∈ {0, 1} and a target label yiL ∈ {0, 1}.
We also have two functions f : RN 7→ {0, 1}, which predicts the
sensitive labels and д : RN 7→ {0, 1}, which predicts the target la-
bels. Given a prediction error function E, the goal is then to produce
a perturbed version of X , X ′, such that the following is minimized:
Ex ′i ∈X ′[ℓ(y
i
L ,д(x ′i )) − λℓ(yiP , f (x ′i ))], (1)
where ℓ is a suitable loss function and λ determines the trade-off
between privacy and utility. As you can see, this definition can be
trivially extended to any categorical or numerical yP and yL by
choosing the correct loss function. The perturbed data, X ′, is then
released for public use.
4 PR-GAN DESIGN
4.1 Architecture
As approximations of f and д, we have two discriminative classi-
fiers, DL and DP , denoted by target and sensitive classifier. We
also use a GAN, with a generative model G in charge of producing
the perturbed data, G(x) = X ′, and a discriminative modelD which
distinguishes X ′ from X . Pд represents the distribution of the gen-
erated data from G. Note that the model can be easily extended
to accommodate multiple classifiers for both sensitive and target
attributes. Both DL and DP are pre-trained classifiers plugged
into our network. The advantage of using pre-trained classifiers,
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Figure 3: Architecture of proposed model. Target classifier
DL and sensitive classifierDP are approximations of f and
д, pre-trained and fixed during training. G andD are trained
in an adversarial setting.
is that we can use classifiers with complex architectures, such as
VGG16 for images [36], to guide the training of G and D. It will be
extremely difficult to train such networks alongside G and D from
scratch. The overall structure of the network is shown in Figure 3.
The process starts by the generatorG taking the original instance
x as input and generating the perturbed version of the data, G(x).
Then G(x) is fed to the discriminatorsD,DL andDP .D’s goal is
distinguishing real data from perturbed data. D(x) represents the
probability that x comes from the original data Pdata rather than
produced data Pд . We can write its loss function as below:
LD = [Ex∼Pdata(x ) logD(G(x)) +
Ex∼Pdata(x ) log
(
1 − D(x))]. (2)
G has multiple objectives. For the trade-off between privacy and
utility, we can rewrite (1) to:
LAdv = Ex
[
ℓ(DL(G(x),yL) − λℓ(DP (G(x),yP )
]
, (3)
where ℓ is a suitable loss function (e.g: cross-entropy loss) and λ
controls the relative trade-off between privacy and utility. G also
wants to fool the GAN discriminatorD in order to create perturbed
data indistinguishable from the real data; the loss function for this
will be:
LGAN = Ex log
(
1 − D(G(x))) . (4)
Finally, it has been shown that using regularization can stabilize
GAN’s training and also provides an additional lever to control the
utility of the perturbed data by limiting the overall perturbation
added to the data [18]. Here, we use a hinge loss:
Lhinge = Ex max
(
0, | |G(x) − x | | − c ), (5)
where c is the maximum distance allowed before any loss is oc-
curred.
Our full objective for G, using (3), (4) and (5), can be written as:
LG = LGAN + αLAdv + βLhinge, (6)
where α and β control the relative importance of the three losses.
At each iteration, we alternate between training D and G while
DP and DL are previously trained and fixed in the network.
To fine-tune the model parameters, with a fixed utility threshold
T in mind, we explore the parameter space to minimize Acc(DP )
while keeping Acc(DL) above T . Similarly, given a fixed privacy
budgetB, we canmaximizeAcc(DL)while keepingAcc(DP ) below
B. Here, Acc(·) denotes the accuracy score.
4.2 Theoretical Analysis
4.2.1 GAN Optimality. In the original GAN design, the gener-
ator G defines a probability distribution Pд as the distribution of
samples generated by G. Under favorable assumptions, the distribu-
tion Pд converges to a good estimator of Pdata – the distribution of
training data [15]. In our case, as we introduce additional classifiers
and gradients, we wish to understand how these classifiers, DP ,
DL , modify the optimal solution and the final distribution.
Since GAN takes an iterative approach, the discriminator D and
the generator G are optimized alternatively. We follow the same
assumption as in [15]: there is enough capacity and training time
and the discriminator is allowed to reach its optimal given a fixed
generator G.
Fixed G, Optimize D. Notice that the discriminator D in our
design uses the same loss function as in the original GAN. So the
following claim is still true.
Lemma 4.1 (Optimal Discriminator [15]). For a fixed generator
G, the optimal discriminator D is
D∗G(x) =
Pdata(x)
Pdata(x) + Pд(x)
,
where Pdata(x) is the probability that x is from the data and Pд(x)
is the probability that x is from the generator G.
Fixed D, Optimize G. In the original GAN, the global minimum
for the generator is achieved if and only if the generated distribution
Pд is the same as Pdata: Pд(x) = Pdata(x). In our setting we show
that the global minimum is achieved if the generator G is an area
preserving flipping map h on Pdata, when such a map exists.
To explain what is an area preserving flipping map, we first
consider the two classifiers DP and DL . Let’s suppose DP and
DL are binary classifiers for now. A piece of data falls in one of the
following four categories:X10,X11,X01,X00, whereXi j , i, j ∈ {0, 1},
contains the data items with label i under DP and label j under
DL . If each data item in Xi j is changed by G to a data item in
category Xi′j with i ′ = 1− i , we will be able to completely foolDP
and pass DL .
Definition 4.2. Denote by Ω the domain of data. An area preserv-
ing flipping map h : Ω → Ω satisfies two conditions:
• Flipping property: h maps each data item x ∈ Xi j ⊆ Ω to an
item x ′ ∈ Xi′j , with i ′ = 1 − i , and
• Area preserving property: ∀Y ⊆ Ω, π (Y ) = π (h−1(Y )), where
π is the probability measure on Ω. That is, the total prob-
ability measure of Y before and after the mapping h is the
same.
Lemma 4.3. If G is such an area preserving flipping map on Ω
with measure Pdata, the generator loss LG is minimized.
Proof. Consider Y ′ ⊆ Ω as the collection of output from G
when the input Y ⊆ Ω is taken with the distribution Pdata, i.e.,
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Y = G−1(Y ′). By the area preserving property, we have Pdata(Y ′) =
Pdata(Y ); also Pд(Y ′) = Pdata(Y ) by definition. Thus Pд(Y ′) =
Pdata(Y ′) for any Y ′ ⊆ Ω.
This essentially ensures that the output x ′ = G(x), with x follow-
ing the distribution Pdata, also follows the same distribution Pdata.
Thus the total loss of the GAN is still minimized, if the discriminator
D is the optimal discriminator D∗G . Further, the flipping property
ensures that for any input x , the manipulated output G(x) com-
pletely fails DP and passes DL . Thus the total loss corresponding
to DP and DL is minimized as well. □
Now the natural question is, when canwe find an area preserving
flipping map on our data? We first start with a definition on DP
and DL .
Definition 4.4. The sensitive classifier DP and the target classi-
fierDL are called balanced if Pdata(Xi j ) = Pdata(Xi′j ), for i ′ = 1−i .
Lemma 4.5. An area preserving flipping map with DP and DL
exists if and only if DP and DL are balanced.
Proof. Clearly, if Pdata(Xi j ) , Pdata(Xi′j ) for some i, j, then
we cannot satisfy the flipping property and area preserving prop-
erty simultaneously. On the other hand, when the total probability
measures of Xi j and Xi′j are the same, there is an area preserving
map h that maps Xi j to Xi′j . First, an area preserving map exists
between any two distribution [32]. Now we define a distribution
π0(x), which is proportional to Pdata(x) for x ∈ X01 ∪ X00, and 0
otherwise. Similarly we define a distribution π1(x) which is propor-
tional to Pdata(x) for x ∈ X11 ∪X10, and 0 otherwise. Now the area
preserving map h from π0 to π1 is an area preserving flipping map
with DP and DL . □
Therefore we can summarize that assuming sufficient capacity
for the generator G and discriminator D with binary features, it is
possible to find an area preserving flipping map with DP and DL
and achieve balance.
Theorem 4.6. When the sensitive classifier DP and the safe clas-
sifier DL are balanced, the global minimum of the generator G is
achieved if G is an area preserving flipping map with respect to DP
and DL .
An example whenDP andDL are not balanced is in Figure 4. In
this case, we have way more data samples in X11 and X00 than X01
and X10. DP and DL are strongly correlated. When x has label i in
DP , very likely it has label i forDL as well. It is nearly impossible
to protect the sensitive features and reveal the target features at the
same time. There is a trade-off between the two objectives – either
the distribution Pд is different from Pdata (hurting generalization
of the model), or the privacy protection cannot be ideal. This trade-
off will be examined and evaluated in the next section. For any two
distributions, the area preserving map is not unique. Thus, the area
preserving flipping map when DP and DL are balanced is not
unique either. Finding one is not trivial though – since we do not
have Pdata. This is mainly what the neural network optimizer is
trying to achieve.
When there are multiple target/sensitive classifiers, the conclu-
sion above can be easily extended. A flipping map will now flip all
labels of the sensitive classifiers and maintain the labels of target
X01
X11
X10
X00
Figure 4: DP and DL are not balanced.
classifiers. When the classifiers are not binary, a flipping map will
change a label to any other label in the sensitive classifier.
4.2.2 Utility and Privacy Protection. In our architecture, two
specific classifiers DP and DL are used. A natural question to
ask is how much the generated data depends on these choices of
classifiers. If the perturbed data fail д = DP with accuracy 1 − ε
we give a bound on the accuracy for a different (unseen) classifier
f , under reasonable conditions.
Definition 4.7 (Total variation distance [7]). For two probability
distributions PX and PX ′ onX, the total variation distance between
them is defined by
| |PX − PX ′ | |TV = maxC⊂X |PX (C) − PX ′(C)|.
Informally, the total variation distance measures the largest
change in probability over all events. For discrete probability distri-
butions, the total variation distance is just the ℓ1 distance between
the vectors in the probability simplex representing the two distri-
butions. The proof can be found in supplemental material.
Theorem 4.8. Suppose that the original data x ∈ Pdata and gen-
erated data G(x) are from distributions with total variance distance
less than β . Consider an instance x with ground truth label y under a
classification task with two classifiers f (·) and д(·) each with accu-
racy ACC(·) ≥ 1 − ε . If the perturbed data successfully fools д, i.e.,
Pr[д(x) , д(G(x))] ≥ 1 − δ , then the perturbed data also fools f :
Pr[f (x) , f (G(x))] ≥ 1 − δ − 4ε − β
Proof. By the definition that x and G(x) are from distributions
with bounded total variance, we have
Pr [f (G(x)) , д(G(x))]
≤ Pr[f (x) , д(x)] + β
≤1 − Pr[f (x) = y,д(x) = y] + β
≤1 − (1 − Pr[f (x) , y] − Pr[д(x) , y)] + β
=1 −ACC(f ) + 1 −ACC(д) + β
≤2ε + β,
If д was used in the training of G(x) and one cannot infer sensitive
labels with д, we now show that the accuracy for f on labeling x
and G(x) differently.
Pr[f (x) , f (G(x))]
≥ Pr[д(x) , д(G(x)), f (x) = д(x), f (G(x)) = д(G(x))]
≥1 − Pr[д(x)) = д(G(X ))] − Pr[f (x) , д(x)]
− Pr[f (G(x)) , д(G(x))]
≥1 − δ − 4ε − β ,
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as claimed. □
Here we can use learner д(·) to denote the model used during
training process, and f (·) the one that is unseen before. Intuitively,
this result formalizes the observation that well-trained classifiers
should possess close decision boundaries in high-probability re-
gions. In such settings, the perturbation that misleads one sensi-
tive classifier will be able to protect the hidden attributes against
other sensitive classifiers with high probability. Although the total
variance distance here measures the distance for distributions of
original and perturbed data instead of the distance between two
actual instances, it can characterize the data manifold dynamics and
guarantee that the perturbation added to the data can protect the
privacy for certain sensitive attributes against arbitrarily trained
classifiers.
Basically, from Theorem 4.8, we can see that for a new sensitive
classifier, the perturbed data will also have high probability to fail
the classifier and protect privacy. Similarly, this holds for the target
classifier as well. This will be further evaluated in the experiment
section later.
4.3 Implementation Details
In order to minimize the dependencies between different compo-
nents in our model, we slice a dataset into 3 parts equal in size and
class proportions. We use the first slice, A, to train DL and DP .
We then use the second slice, B, to train G and D while using the
previously trained DP and DL . Finally, we use the last slice, C ,
for testing purposes. Each slice is further divided into training and
testing parts, with a ratio of 4:1, denoted by Ytrain and Ytest for a
slice Y .
Note that our method is not dependent on any specific architec-
ture for DP and DL , and any model supporting gradient updates
can be used here. We are assuming full access to the prediction
results of the pre-trained classifiers. Since the training of classifiers
for sensitive and target attributes and also the generative network
is done by the data contributor/publisher, and not adversaries, this
assumption is valid. However, we are assuming that an adversary,
using a separate dataset (which can be public), trains a classifier
to retrieve sensitive information and then attack the published
data. Our goal is to prevent such attacks, while showing utility
preservation.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Datasets
Below,we go over the datasets we have used alongwith the sensitive
and target attributes we have defined for each:
(1) MNIST [23]: A dataset of handwritten letters, which in-
cludes 60,000 training and 10,000 test examples. For this
dataset, we define target attributes as the parity (being odd or
even) of the numbers and the sensitive attributes as whether
or not a digit is greater than 5. Note that this is only a hypo-
thetical application to showcase the strength of our method
on a well-studied dataset.
(2) PubFig Faces [22]: This dataset includes 58,797 images of
200 people. Inspired by the concerns around identity-revealing
capabilities of face images, we define sensitive attributes as
x G
DP
D
DLG(x) x G
D
DP
DLG(x)
Naive Generative
Privacy
Adversarial
Privacy
Figure 5: The architecture of the two generative baselines
compared to our method in the experiments.
the identity of each subject while each person’s gender is the
target attribute. This can happen in a scenario where subjects
are willing to donate images to train a classifier, but are afraid
about their identities being revealed. To achieve a higher
performance, we aligned the images using MTCNN [43] and
removed duplicate images for each person. We then filtered
out subjects with less than 200 images. This left us with 6,553
images, 2,279 of women and 4,274 of men, from a total of 15
people. We used the VGG16 [36] architecture with modified
top layers to perform both classification tasks.
(3) UJI Indoor Localization [38]: Here, signal strengths of 520
WiFi access points (WAP) are recorded for 21,048 locations
inside 3 different buildings. The buildings have a total of 13
floors. In addition, each instance has a coordinate, which
we use to cluster locations on each floor into 8 groups. We
define the sensitive attribute as the specific cluster a user
was in, and the target attribute the floor on which the user
was. This is inspired by a scenario where contributors of
the data are willing to reveal their location up to a certain
granularity. Although the signal strengths are numerical, we
achieved better results by changing the signals into binary
attributes indicating the presence or absence of signal from
a WAP. For brevity we call this dataset theWiFi dataset from
now on.
The detailed architectures of classifiers for each task and each
dataset is mentioned in provided in the supplemental materials.
5.2 Baseline
In our experiments, we compare our method against the following
baselines:
• Naive Generative Privacy (NGP): We have argued that
by utilizing a GAN’s structure, we can produce more re-
alistic perturbed data similar to the original. This will in
turn increase the utility of the resulting datasets. To test this
hypothesis we create an alternative architecture by remov-
ing D. We expect this method to provide a lower privacy
guarantee (higher Acc(DP )) given a fixed utility threshold.
• Adversarial Privacy (AP): We believe that the existence of
a target classifier (DL ) to guide the training of G is essential
for a better utility guarantee, and so we compare our method
to an alternative architecture where DL is removed. This
is essentially formulating the problem of privacy protection
as defending against an adversary model (in our case DP ).
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Table 1: Performance of the methods on 3 datasets; lower is better. Target accuracy threshold is mentioned in parenthesis.
Method
Sensitive Accuracy
MNIST PubFig WiFi
(Acc(DL) ≥ 0.95) (Acc(DL) ≥ 0.95) (Acc(DL) ≥ 0.75)
PR-GAN 0.125 0.175 0.177
NGP 0.305 0.211 0.178
AP 0.897 0.571 0.477
DP 0.806 0.783 0.464
Original∗ 0.984 0.807 0.759
∗ Non-perturbed data.
We expect this method to provide a lower privacy guarantee
(higher Acc(DP )) given a fixed utility threshold.
• Differential Privacy (DP): For real-valued vectors (image
datasets), we use the Laplace Mechanism known to achieve
ε-differential privacy, where independent noise is added to
each pixel with the Laplacian distribution:
Lap(z |b) = |z |2b exp
(
− 1
b
)
.
Here, b is the scale parameter of the distribution and this
method achieves 1/b-differential privacy [11]. For theWiFi dataset,
where attributes are binary, we use a Randomized Response
(RR) approach [11] where for each bit of information u ∈
{0, 1}, we report its true value with probability p or else re-
porting either 0 or 1 uniformly at random. Such a mechanism
provides ln
( 1+p
1−p
)
-differential privacy. We perform this per-
turbation mechanism for each of the 520 signals and report
the result for each record.
Our method is denoted by PR-GAN throughout experiments.
5.3 Running on Mobile Devices
As discussed earlier, once trained, we can remove the trained gener-
ator (G) and deploy it on remote devices to produce perturbations
for users from source. This has the advantage that users will not
need to trust an external entity with the safety of their sensitive
information. The complexity and efficiency of a neural network
depends on many factors, but as is common practice [34], we mea-
sure it by counting the number of parameters in a network and the
number of floating-point operations (FLOP). In Table 2, we com-
pare the complexity of our networks with state-of-the-art networks
designed specifically to run on mobile devices. As you can see, our
generator networks are more compact and computationally inex-
pensive compared to the state-of-the-art, which indicates that it is
possible to deploy and use them on mobile devices using currently
available technologies.
5.4 Performance
To show that our method is capable of effectively concealing the
sensitive attributes while preserving the information about target
attributes, we compare our method against the baselines across
3 datasets with a fixed utility (Acc(DL)) threshold. We select a
threshold of 0.95 for the two image datasets, PubFig and MNIST,
Table 2: The complexity of our models compared to state-
of-the-art models designed for ImageNet [21] classification
task on mobile devices.
Network FLOP Parameters
MobileNetV1 1.0 [16] 575M 4.2M
ShuffleNet 1.5x [44] 292M 3.4M
NasNet-A [46] 564M 5.3M
MobileNetV2 1.0 [34] 300M 3.4M
Our Generators
MNIST 1.6M 235.4K
PubFig 232M 644.2K
WiFi 2.1M 1.1M
and 0.75 for the WiFi dataset. As we will see later on, due to high
correlation between the sensitive and target attributes in the WiFi
dataset, it is harder to effectively conceal sensitive attributes while
keeping the target attributes almost intact. We dive deeper into the
trade-off between utility and privacy in a case study on the WiFi
dataset in Section 5.5.
Recall from Section 4.3 that the dataset is divided into 3 slices, the
first used to train DL andDP , the second to train the networks G
and D and the third used for testing. To tune the hyperparameters
for neural networks, we further split the GAN’s training data into
two parts, with a ratio of 4:1 and preserving the class proportions,
and use the smaller part as a validation set to keep Acc(DL) above
the fixed threshold. For the methods based on DP, the optimal value
of ε is found by iterating over different values of ε from 0.01 to 10
and selecting the largest ε (corresponding to the smallest added
noise) where Acc(DL) is above the set threshold and report the
resulting Acc(DP ).
The performance of the methods along with the performance of
the classifier on sensitive attributes on the original, non-perturbed
data is available in Table 1. First, note that the two methods that do
not utilize the target attributes in producing perturbations (DP and
AP) achieve results that are far less promising than the other two
methods. Furthermore, as the objectives become more complicated
moving from binary attributes (WiFi dataset) to image data (MNIST
and PubFig), this gap between the two groups grow wider and
wider. Finally, you can see that our method, taking advantage of
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Table 3: Performance of the original (Model 1) and two newmodels (Models 2 and 3) in sensitive and target classification tasks.
Our results transfer to new architectures with minimal change.
Dataset
Target Accuracy (%) Avg. Utility Sensitive Accuracy (%) Avg. Privacy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Drop (%) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Random Drop (%)
MNIST 95.19 94.07 92.73 1.79 12.49 43.51 46.18 50.00 0.00
PubFig 95.47 95.23 95.71 0.12 17.5 10.71 17.38 6.67 0.00
WiFi 75.77 76.96 72.27 1.75 17.75 19.77 20.66 0.97 2.47
the adversarial training of a GAN, can hide the sensitive attributes
more effectively given the same utility threshold. This shows that
the GAN plays an essential part in achieving superior results. It is
also worth noting that in the case of image datasets, we achieved a
significant reduction in sensitive accuracy while choosing a thresh-
old very close to the the original accuracy values (0.990 for MNIST
and 0.977 for PubFig).
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Figure 6: The trade-off between achieved privacy
(∆ Acc(DP )) and utility loss budget (∆ Acc(DL) for the
WiFi dataset.
5.5 Utility vs. Privacy
Ideally, one looks to perturb the data in a way that a classifier
on sensitive attributes fails completely (with accuracy close to
that of a random classifier) while a classifier on target attributes
continues to perform as before. However, in many cases where the
two objectives are in conflict and the sensitive and target attributes
are correlated, this might not be possible. In these cases, a good
trade-off between privacy and utility is desirable. Here, we test our
method against the baselines over different utility loss budgets (a
maximum allowed drop in Acc(DL)) and compare the achieved
privacy (drop in Acc(DP )).
The utility loss budget is chosen from the interval [0.03, 0.12],
corresponding to Acc(DL) ∈ [0.80, 0.89]. Since we optimize the
hyperparameters over many settings for all methods, we were only
able to carry out this experiment on the WiFi dataset with the
resources available to us.
You can see the results in Figure 6 where the x-axis is the utility
loss budget and y-axis is the achieved privacy. As you can see,
for every budget, our method outperforms the others and as we
increase the budget, the margin between our achieved privacy and
the others grows larger. Also worth noting is that the methods that
are not guided by a classifier on target attributes (DP and AP) have a
lower privacy gain per budget compared to the other two (PR-GAN
and NGP). The results show that in difficult conditions, our method
is capable of achieving a higher privacy guarantee given the same
utility drop budget.
5.6 Transferability
We now test whether our results transfer to new models with a
different architecture. We take the perturbed datasets produced in
Section 5.4, and use two neural networks with new architectures
trained on the original training data to perform the target and sen-
sitive classification tasks. We then compare the resulting accuracy
values with those reported in Section 5.4. We expect the results
to remain relatively the same. The 3 architectures used for every
dataset is shown in the 3 tables in Appendix A.
On the target classification task, we prefer no drop in accuracy
when we change the model’s architecture. For sensitive attributes,
we would like to see the new model performing worse than the
original model or a random classifier2. We formally define a drop in
utility and privacy incurred by substituting the model’s architecture
as:
Utility Drop = max
(
Acc(M) −Acc(M ′), 0) (7)
Privacy Drop = max
(
Acc(M ′) −max (Acc(M),Acc(RC)), 0), (8)
whereM is the original model,M ′ the newmodel, RC a random clas-
sifier and Acc(·) the accuracy of each model in the corresponding
classification task.
Note that the goal here is that the result on one neural network
transfers to another with minimal changes to either utility or pri-
vacy. You can see the 3 models’ accuracy values and the average
utility and privacy drops over two new architectures in Table 3. As
you can see, the drops in privacy and utility incurred by a change
in the network’s architecture are extremely low. The highest drop
in utility is equal to 1.79% while the highest drop in privacy is
equal to 2.47% and in both image datasets there are no drops in
our privacy guarantee for neither of new architectures, which is
ideal. Note that in the case of MNIST sensitive attributes, although
the two new architectures have a performance significantly higher
than that of the original model, they are both below the random
classifier performance threshold (50%). Since no one can guarantee
a performance lower than that of a random classifier, this is ideal.
2A classifier that spits out an output class selected uniformly at random.
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These results suggest that the effects of our perturbations are trans-
ferable to other neural networks with different architectures. Since
an adversary can choose any model to attack our perturbations, it
is important to design a method with utility guarantees which can
be extended to other networks with arbitrary architectures.
5.7 Training Utility
Table 4: Utility of perturbed data for Inference (where a
model trained on original data is tested on perturbed data)
and Training (where a model is trained on perturbed data
and tested on original data) purposes
Dataset
Target Accuracy (%)
Inference Training
MNIST 95.19 96.72
PubFig 95.47 98.84
WiFi 75.77 73.72
In previous sections we demonstrated that our published datasets
can be used for inference tasks on target attributes with high utility
guarantees. In another scenario, it is possible that individuals share
their anonymized data, using our method to produce perturbations,
with an external entity to contribute to the training of a new model.
This model can in turn be deployed on the individuals’ devices to
perform classification tasks on their raw, private data. To see if we
can provide the same level of utility in this scenario as we did in
the inference tasks before, we train new models for the 3 datasets
on the perturbed datasets produced in Section 5.4 and test them
on original data. The results are available in Table 4. As you can
see, there is little or no significant change in the accuracy of the 3
models, which indicates that ourmethod is capable to provide a high
utility guarantee for both inference purposes as well as training
purposes. This experiment shows a key advantage of our method
over previous works where the perturbed data is in a transformed
featured space and unsuitable to train models that can be tested on
the original data [8, 24, 26].
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we have tried to bridge the gap between privacy
preserving data publishing and deep generative models, a field
that is on the rise and is used extensively in other areas such as
adversarial learning. We showed that it is possible to use deep
neural networks as clues for generating tailored perturbations. By
choosing this approach, not only we can effectively protect sensitive
information, but we can also maintain the information necessary
for a given target application. Note that the goal here is to fool
a classifiers on specific tasks and not human beings. The results
might seem clearly distinguishable from a human’s point of view,
but a machine might be unable to tell the difference.
Our experiments showed that our method’s clear advantage
over conventional methods, it’s capability in finding a good trade-
off between privacy and utility, it’s utility for both training and
inference tasks, and the ability to be utilized on mobile devices with
limited computational resources.
Finally, as more improved generative models are proposed, we
can easily plug them into our framework to achieve better results.
We believe that there are many interesting avenues of research to
continue this work, including utilizing different GAN architectures
to perturb different types of data (e.g: time series or very high
resolution images), or guiding the users on the data they are about
to share with a trusted central unit, to help train models without
revealing private and potentially sensitive information.
A GENERATOR ARCHITECTURE DETAILS
Here are detailed architectures used in our experiments. Model 1
is the original architecture used across all experiments. Models 2
and 3 are the additional architectures used in the transferability
experiment.
Table 5: Model Architectures on MNIST. (Conv: convolution
layer, FC: fully-connected layer. )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Conv(64,5,5)+Relu Conv(64,8,8)+Relu Conv(32,3,3)+Relu
Conv(64,5,5)+Relu Dropout(0.2) Conv(32,3,3)+Relu
Dropout(0.25) Conv(128, 6, 6)+Relu MaxPooling(2,2)
FC(128)+Relu Conv(128, 5, 5)+Relu Conv(64,3,3)+Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Conv(64,3,3)+Relu
FC(2)+Softmax FC(2)+Softmax MaxPooling(2,2)
FC(200)+Relu
FC(2)+Softmax
Table 6: Model architectures on UJI Indoor Localization
dataset (FC : fully-connected layer)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FC(256)+Relu FC(1024)+Relu FC(256)+Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(128)+Relu FC(512)+Relu FC(256)+Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(64)+Relu FC(Dim(Y )) FC(Dim(Y ))
FC(Dim(Y )) Softmax Softmax
Softmax
Table 7: Model architectures on PubFig dataset, built on top
of VGG16 network [36] (minus the 5 topmost layers).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
VGG16 base VGG166 base VGG166 base
FCC(1024)+Relu FCC(512)+Relu FCC(512)+Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(512)+Relu FC(512)+Relu FC(256)+Relu
FC(Dim(Y )) FC(Dim(Y )) FC(Dim(Y ))
Softmax Softmax Softmax
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